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THE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT: THE IMPACT OF EARLY WARNINGS 
OF FUTURE THRESHOLDS UNDER DIFFERENT FRAMING AND RISK 
CONTEXTS 
Abstract 
The effect of announcing future institutional change is investigated in three 
different contexts: a gains frame, a loss frame, and a loss frame with risk. The 
institutional change is the transition from a normal public goods game into a 
threshold public goods game. Announcements may change subject behaviour, 
through influencing their expectations, before the implementation of the new 
institution (adjustment effect) and/or after the implementation (adaptation 
effect).We find that announcements in the gains frame cause zero adjustment 
effects and negative adaptation effects; while announcements in the loss frame 
cause positive adjustment and adaptation effects. However, including risk into 
the threshold phase of the loss frame causes the announcements to have zero 
effects. These results have important implications for the climate change 
debate. 
 (JEL classification: C9; H41; H30; Q54) 
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Humanity has, up until now, been freely contributing to the pollution of the atmosphere while 
the negative effects have only been felt marginally by the whole planet. However, in recent 
years, scientists have become aware that the climate may be reaching a tipping point due to 
anthropocentric interference, passed which irreversible and dangerous climate change will occur 
causing large, discontinuous harm to both natural and human systems (O‘Neill & Oppenheimer 
2002; Solomon et al. 2009). The 2009 Copenhagen Accord resulted in a non-binding agreement 
to stop catastrophic climate change by limiting the global temperature rise to below 2 degrees 
Celsius by requiring all nations to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gasses (Rogelj et al. 
2010). The scientific findings of future climate thresholds are effectively announcements of a 
coming change in the implicit institutional environment of carbon emissions from a continuous 
public good game to that of a threshold public good game. The current paper situates itself 
within the framework of such institutional change. Our main aim is to investigate what impact an 
early-warning announcement of future institutional change, such as impending climate 
thresholds, has on countries‘ voluntary contributions to carbon emissions abatement 
We build on the work done by Visser et al. (2014) by performing laboratory experiments 
testing the impact of announcements of future institutional change in three differently framed 
contexts. The institutional change is that of 20 periods of continuous public goods games 
transitioning to 10 periods of a threshold public goods game. The effect of announcements of the 
future institutional change are then tested in a gains frame, where contributions go towards 
yielding benefit; in a loss frame, where contributions go towards reducing a loss; and a loss-and-
risk frame, where the negative impact from not reaching the threshold only exists with a 50% 
chance in the new threshold institution. 
The behavioural changes that accompany the transition from one set of institutions to another 
is a topic that has received relatively little investigation in the field of economics. Those studies 
that do focus on institutional change mainly do so in light of endogenous versus exogenously 
imposed changes of institution (see for example: Janssen et al. 2008; Sutter et al. 2010). Virtually 
no attention has been given to the impact of early-warning announcements of impending 
exogenously imposed institutional change, apart from the recent paper by Visser et al. (2014) 
5 
 
who provide initial experimental evidence on the positive impact of announcements of future 
punishment opportunities. This is the first paper in the literature to model the impact of 
announcements of the future transition into a threshold public goods game structure. We also 
include a pre-experimental measure of subjects‘ risk attitudes using the Eckel & Grossman 
(2008b) method of gamble choices and include these as predictors of subject behaviour in the 
public goods games, which we believe has not been done before. 
The theory of change that accounts for the potential impacts of announcements on behaviour 
follows closely the theory of rational expectations. The theory states that anticipation of policy  
change is a vital part of whether the change has an effect, as a population who anticipates change 
can revise their expectations, and thus their behaviour, immediately leading to zero overall 
policy effectiveness (Sargent & Wallace 1976; Holland 1985; Heijdra & van der Ploeg 2002). 
Therefore the main vehicle for behavioural change caused by announcements is their influence 
on the expectations of the population. In this paper we will look at two major avenues in which 
the announcement effect can occur. The announcements of a future institutional change can have 
an immediate effect, before the implementation of the new institution (adjustment effect) or it 
can have a later effect, after the implementation of the new institution (adaptation effect). The 
term adjustment effect has been adapted from the use of the term adjustment path which 
represents the effect of announcements on behaviour before the implementation of institutional 
change (Adams et al. 2001; Heijdra and van der Ploeg, 2002). While our adaptation effect term 
has been modified from Blundell et al.‘s (2001) use of the term implementation effect to model 
the effect announcements have after the implementation of an institutional change 
Our findings suggest that announcements can increase the effectiveness of eventual 
institutional change. While in the gains frame we see zero adjustment effects and negative 
adaptation effects of announcements, in the loss frame we find significant positive adjustment 
effects of increased contributions and significant positive adaptation effects of higher likelihoods 
of groups reaching the threshold. However, when the loss frame is combined with risky impact 
from not reaching the threshold, all significant effects previously found due to announcements 
are negated.  
6 
 
We also find strong evidence that the initial adjustment effect in the loss frame is mediated by 
the announcements‘ influence on the likelihood of subjects playing by certain strategies such as 
free-riding or full cooperation. However, the adaptation effects found in the gains and loss frame 
have only weak evidence for a similar announcement effect on player strategies. There is also 
evidence that among groups successful in reaching the threshold, the announcements cause 
stronger, earlier action relative to successful groups who do not receive the announcements. 
The above results have important implications for the climate change debate, especially 
considering the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting that will be held in Paris in 2015 to 
implement legally binding emissions reduction pledges from nations. A natural application of 
this research is the efficacy of early warning systems in the climate change debate. An integral 
part of early warning systems is the dissemination of timely information in order to enable 
threatened individuals to prepare and act so as to reduce the possibility of harm (UNISDR 2010). 
This information dissemination can be seen as a series of announcements, such as those 
described in the current paper. Numerous studies have attested to the possibility and the benefits 
of early warning systems with regards to the negative impacts of tipping over dangerous climate 
thresholds, in particular the two degree Celsius warming threshold (Lenton 2011; Rogers & 
Tsirkunov 2011; Huntingford et al. 2012; Marvin et al. 2013; Ludescher et al. 2014). Alfieri et 
al. (2012) attribute a large degree of the benefits of early warning systems to increased 
population preparedness and coordination, as well as a necessary philosophical perspective 
change from post-disaster recovery to disaster prevention. However, what is lacking from the 
literature is a focus on how early warning initiatives can actually affect individual-level 
cooperative decisions; it has even been stated that ‗the individual‘s willingness to act cannot be 
taken for granted‘ (Rogers & Tsirkunov 2011: 14). The current study is an initial probe into this 
void in the literature. The inclusion of a context in our experimental design that incorporates risk 
in the new institution is to mimic the inherently unpredictable nature of the future and, in 
particular, the various uncertainties implicit with the current scientific knowledge of climate 




2. Literature Review  
2.1 Public Goods Games & Threshold Public Goods Games 
The phenomenon of cooperation in social dilemmas where collective interests and 
individuals‘ private interests are at odds is an area that has been increasingly studied by the 
experimental economics tradition using public goods games (PGGs). A tenet of traditional 
economic game theory implies that humans act only out of narrow self-interest, which would 
result in zero cooperation in such dilemmas, yet this has been consistently violated in 
experimental findings where significantly more than zero cooperation is observed (Andreoni 
1995a; Hoffman et al. 1998). The importance of using experimental methods to study 
cooperation stems from their ability to simulate real life social dilemmas, such as climate change, 
while isolating the effect of particular interventions in a controlled environment (Ledyard 1995; 
Zelmer 2003). Interventions that are found to have a significant impact on cooperation in the 
laboratory can then be applied to real life situations with the evidence that ceteris paribus they 
will have an effect. 
Threshold public goods games (TPGGs) are an extension of the classic experimental public 
goods game in which each individual is placed into a group and asked to contribute to some 
public good yielding a return. In the classic PGG, the welfare-maximising solution is reached if 
everyone contributes to the public good, but each individual has the incentive to contribute 
nothing (free-ride) in order to maximise their own pay-off (Zelmer 2003). As such, there exists a 
social dilemma as there is always a conflict between individual and collective interests. 
However, with the addition of a threshold in TPGGs, the payoff structure of the public goods 
game is transformed into a coordination game, with the threshold as a focal point (Cadsby & 
Maynes 1999; Barrett & Dannenberg 2012). Herein lies the main difference between TPGGs and 
PGGs: the inclusion of a threshold turns a social dilemma into a social coordination game, where 
cooperation can benefit the collective as well as the individual if the threshold is met (Abele et 
al. 2010). In TPGGs, any combination of contributions that sum to the threshold exactly is both a 
Nash Equilibrium and Pareto efficient, whereas PGGs if linear only have one Nash Equilibrium 
(zero contribution) and one Pareto efficient solution (full contribution), which are at odds (Abele 
et al. 2010). 
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The placement of the threshold can vary in different TPGG designs. In the traditional model, 
the threshold exists after each contribution period, making it either a one-shot game or a series of 
one-shot games (Rapoport & Eshed-Levy 1989; Erev & Rapoport 1990; Rapoport & Suleiman 
1993; Cadsby & Maynes 1999). In a more recent variation of the model the threshold is 
cumulative, in that contributions to the public good are summed over a number of periods, at the 
end of which a cumulative threshold must be met (Milinski et al. 2008; Dannenberg et al. 2011; 
Tavoni et al. 2011). This design nuance means that there is conflict between short-term and long-
term interest (Milinski et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2012). This conflict element increases the social 
dilemma aspect which traditional TPGG designs minimize and allows for the modelling of inter-
temporal social dilemmas, such as dangerous climate change. As such, the cumulative threshold 
design will be used in the experiment presented here. 
The mechanics of the threshold work as such: if the sum of contributions from group members 
does not equal or exceed the threshold, then the group as a whole either fails to earn a reward or 
incurs a loss, depending on the framing of the game (Sonnemans et al. 1998; Iturbe-Ormaetxe et 
al. 2011). A traditional feature of TPGGs is the step-return of reward (loss) from reaching (not 
reaching) the threshold, which is lump-sum and constant, as these public goods ‗do not increase 
in quality or quantity after more contributions [over the threshold] are voluntarily made‘ 
(Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993: 172). This element gives rise to threshold public goods also 
being known as lumpy, binary, discrete, or step-level goods. 
Total contributions which fall short of the threshold level may be returned to contributors in 
some studies (McBride 2006). This would be an example of a refund policy or a money back 
guarantee, which have been shown to increase cooperation and public good provision, possibly 
by alleviating the incentive for non-cooperative behaviour of fear of others‘ non-contribution 
(Rapoport & Eshed-Levy 1989; Cadsby & Maynes 1999; Menezes et al. 2001). In general, 
contributions which exceed the threshold level are not returned to contributors (Nitzan & 
Romano 1990; Marks & Croson 1998; Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. 2011). However, such rebate 
policies have been shown to increase cooperation and public good provision, especially if a 
proportional rebate rule is used, this potentially works by diminishing the greed motivation for 
non-cooperation (Rapoport & Eshed-Levy 1989; Spencer et al. 2009). Including a rebate or 
refund rule might misrepresent a special element of modelling certain threshold public goods 
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which often entail the fear and greed incentives for not cooperating as vital strategic components. 
These rules basically amount to insurance against any other outcome but the efficient Nash 
Equilibrium of contributions meeting the threshold exactly. Such insurance is commonly not 
possible in real life scenarios due to the sunk cost characteristic of things like investments into 
climate change abatement or the physical contribution of hours of one‘s time volunteered for a 
project (Makris 2009) . 
Various mechanisms to increase contributions and public good provision in TPGG have been 
explored. Continuous contributions have been shown to increase contributions and public good 
provision relative to binary contributions. High thresholds; unequal initial endowments and low 
rewards (step-returns) have been found to decrease contributions and provision, though pre-play 
communication and taxation helps to alleviate the impact of inequality and increase cooperation 
(Rapoport & Suleiman 1993; Cadsby & Maynes 1999; Croson & Marks 2000; Brick & Visser 
2010; Tavoni et al. 2011; Van der Hoven et al. 2012) Allowing subjects to contribute 
sequentially rather than simultaneously has also been shown to increase contribution levels and 
public good provision (Erev & Rapoport 1990; Normann & Rau 2011). Increasing the 
identifiability of subjects‘ decisions has been found by Marks & Croson (1998) to increase 
contributions and provision, possibly through the motivation of reputation-seeking within 
groups. 
2.1.1 Framing Effects and Loss-Aversion  
The framing of Public Goods Games also affects subject behaviour. The quintessential element 
of framing is the presentation of logically equivalent options in superficially different ways 
(Krishnamurthy et al. 2001). Tversky & Kahneman (1986) describe how people systematically 
behave differently when faced with different presentational formats of equivalent options, a 
phenomenon known as framing effects. Such framing effects, the authors argue, violate the 
rational choice axiom of invariance and render normative models of choice unable to provide 
descriptive accounts of human behaviour. There are many ways that choices can be framed 
differently, but for this review we will focus only on valence framing: positive (gains) and 
negative (loss) presentations. 
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Andreoni (1995b) provides one of the earliest studies of framing in normal PGGs. The model 
he constructs are derived from the fact that a public good rendering non-excludable positive 
value is logically equivalent to a private good rendering non-excludable negative value. He finds 
that his positive frame results in higher cooperation than his negative frame. More recent work 
has supported this view. Cox (2014) performs experiments using more nuanced and decomposed 
definitions of framing effects and finds a similar pattern but reduced significance of loss framing 
in the context of contributions to public goods, while framing effects are almost entirely driven 
by responses from male subjects.  Andreoni's (1995b) findings and also found that negative 
framing has a stronger impact on subjects with  more individualistic oriented values versus 
subjects with more cooperative orientations (Willinger & Ziegelmeyer 1999; Park 2000). The 
current paper will utilise the same template of Andreoni (1995b) in designing our loss framed 
PGG, but it will also heed the nuances proposed in Cox (2014) in terms of instructional 
simplicity. The motivations in our two PGG frames can be summarised as i) gains frame – 
benefit maximisation and ii) loss frame – loss minimisation. 
The TPGG can also be framed either positively (gains frame), whereby contributions go 
towards the provision of a monetary reward; or negatively (loss frame), whereby contributions 
go towards preventing a monetary loss. The loss framed TPGG can be quite similar in structure 
to the Common Pool Resource (CPR) dilemma, in which a group of subjects must decide 
individually how much to extract from an exhaustible resource (joint account) for private gain, 
which yields negative externalities to other group members (Budescu et al. 1995). Sonnemans et 
al (1998) show that behaviour is similar between the two frames for early periods of repeated 
interactions, yet after a while contributions decay in the loss frame causing provision and 
cooperation to diminish relative to the positive frame. Bougherara et al (2007)  also finds that a 
loss frame leads to lower cooperation, and also notes that framing effects seem to be most 
powerful under high thresholds. 
Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al (2011)  also study framing effects, yet their experiments contrast  
Sonnemans et al (1998) and Bougherara et al's (2007) findings by showing that contributions are 
higher in the loss frame (when thresholds are high) compared to the gains frame due to loss 
aversion; and that the loss frame results in more overall efficiency. However, Iturbe-Ormaetxe et 
al's (2011) study differs in one critical way that might explain the different findings. The authors‘ 
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loss frame treatment does not work by subjects deciding how much to withdraw from a joint 
account, as in Sonnemans et al (1998) and Bougherara et al (2007). Rather, subjects are initially 
endowed with a higher amount, representing value already enjoyed from a public good and then 
they are asked to contribute to avoid the deterioration of the public good which would result in a 
loss. The authors argue that the gains and loss frames differ with respect to reference points. In 
the loss frame the reference point is the already enjoyed benefit from the public good, whereas in 
the gains frame the reference point is the cost of contributing out of their private endowment 
(Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. 2011). It is this formulation of a loss frame that the current paper will 
utilise due to its contribution mechanism being more comparable to that of the gains frame and 
its congruence with other papers modelling dangerous climate change (Milinski et al. 2008; 
Brick & Visser 2010; Hasson et al. 2010; Tavoni et al. 2011; Hasson et al. 2012; Van der Hoven 
et al. 2012). 
The finding from Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) that the loss frame induces more cooperation is 
in line with the concept of loss-aversion. Championed by Tversky & Kahneman (1986,1991), 
loss-aversion implies that losses are weighted more heavily than equal quantity gains in peoples‘ 
subjective utility functions. An example of loss-aversion is a phenomenon known as the 
endowment effect, whereby people value the same good more if they own it than if they do not 
(Thaler 1980). This corresponds to the loss framed TPGG by predicting that people already 
enjoying the value stemming from a public good in their private endowment will contribute more 
to avoid losing this value than people who contribute only to win a reward of the same value 
(gains frame), a result which Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) found. Recent work on loss-aversion 
has found that people exhibit strongly correlated levels of loss aversion across both risky and 
riskless choices; that loss aversion is positively related to age and wealth and decreases in 
education; and that loss-aversion may exist in varying levels in different life domains due to 
evolutionary pressures (Gächter et al. 2010; Li et al. 2012) 
The literature on TPGGs mainly uses loss frames in order to model ecological systems such as 
rivers, forests and the global climate which entail dramatic losses of function after a threshold 
level of exploitation has been reached (Rapoport & Suleiman 1993; Milinski et al, 2008; Wang et 
al, 2009; Dannenberg et al. 2011; Horan et al. 2011; Laurance et al. 2011; Tavoni et al, 2011; 
Barrett & Dannenberg 2012; Hasson et al. 2012). Gains framed TPGGs can also model the 
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minimum contributions required to meet a public good which requires a minimum capital 
investment such as the building of a bridge or a wildlife reserve or the building of a community 
garden or a public library (Menezes et al. 2001; Abele et al. 2010; Carlsson et al. 2011). 
Although it has not been done before (to the best of the authors‘ knowledge), species 
conservation might also lend itself to modelling by loss framed TPGG. If a minimum amount of 
protection is not conveyed upon an endangered species or its habitat, the population numbers 
might cross a tipping point and lead to catastrophic collapse (Dai et al. 2012), which would entail 
a large, discontinuous loss of value spread equally among all people. 
2.1.2 Uncertainty and Risk 
The impacts of different forms of uncertainty and risk on contribution behaviour have also 
been explored in the public goods games literature. Although it is a contentious subject, we will 
distinguish between risk and uncertainty by a particular reading of the Knightian view which 
states that risk is a situation where a future event occurs with a known probability, whereas 
uncertainty is a situation where a future event occurs with unknown probability (Langlois & 
Cosgel 1993). In every form of public goods game there is social uncertainty, which describes 
strategic risk as other people‘s contribution behaviour cannot be known ex ante (Rapoport & 
Eshed-Levy 1989; Eckel & Grossman 2008a; McCarter et al. 2010; Murphy & Ackermann 
2013). Environmental uncertainty or risk can also be incorporated into various positions in the 
threshold public goods games. 
Threshold uncertainty is usually modelled by making the threshold lie somewhere within a 
known probability distribution (commonly a uniform distribution) between a range of values, 
and thus increasing the uncertainty is represented by a mean-preserving increase in the spread of 
the range (McBride 2010). It is consistently found that increasing threshold uncertainty 
diminishes cooperation and the likelihood of public good provision, especially when the value of 
the public good is relatively low (Nitzan & Romano 1990; Suleiman et al. 2001; McBride 2006; 
Barbieri & Malueg 2010; Barrett & Dannenberg 2012). Impact uncertainty has been modelled in 
a similar way: by increasing the range of possible severity that the impact of not reaching the 
threshold (in the loss frame) causes. This type of uncertainty has been shown to have no 
significant impact on contribution behaviour (Barret and Dannenberg, 2012). However, 
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McCarter et al (2010) study impact uncertainty of the same structure described above and find 
that only when uncertainty in the value of the return from reaching the threshold includes the 
prospects of a loss (i.e a range of {-50;100} instead of {50;150}), does the uncertainty decrease 
contributions. 
A form of impact risk is a case where (in a loss framed TPGG) if the threshold is not reached, 
a negative impact, of known severity occurs with some known probability. This type of risk has 
been used in TPGGs called Collective Risk Social Dilemmas or Climate Games and as such have 
been used frequently to model the dynamics of disastrous climate change. Findings on the effects 
of such risk have consistently shown that a higher risk of negative impact increases cooperation 
and disaster avoidance (Milinski et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2009; Santos & Pacheco 2011; Tavoni 
et al. 2011). Chakra & Traulsen (2012) study the evolutionary dynamics of contributions under 
this type of risk and find that the strategy of late contributing (not contributing initially and then 
compensating later) fares better than the fair-sharing strategy, and thus what is set as the 
maximum contribution per period determines the timing of procrastinated contributions. Risk in 
this form could also be called threshold existence risk, as the probabilistic impact occurring from 
not reaching the threshold is tantamount to the threshold having a probabilistic existence. The 
current paper will utilise risk in this form, as it maximises our comparability to other studies 
utilising similar design features. 
2.2 Expectations & Announcements 
A well-documented element in the literature is the mediating role played by expectations on 
subjects‘ contribution behaviour. Authors have consistently found evidence that a significant 
proportion of the population can be described as conditional cooperators: people who are willing 
to cooperate if they expect that a significant number of other people will also cooperate (Sugden 
1984; Sonnemans et al. 1998; Burlando & Guala 2005; Rege & Telle 2004; Milinski et al. 2008; 
Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. 2011; Visser 2013; Gächter 2014). This means that higher expectations of 
others‘ contribution will increase the contribution of an individual. Including a threshold adds a 
coordination point and thus leads subjects to focus their expectations on whether or not their 
contribution will be pivotal in reaching the threshold level of contributions. A higher expected 
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probability of being pivotal in reaching the threshold increases an individual‘s contribution 
(McBride 2006). 
With this in mind, an institutional mechanism which increases the coordination of expectations 
might result in increased contribution and public good provision (Tavoni et al. 2011). The 
mechanism of introducing announcements of the future implementation of thresholds in a public 
goods game might be able to play this expectation-coordinating role. Cavaliere (2001) illustrates 
how the coordination problem can be solved by subjects using random exogenous signals to 
correlate their strategies. Public announcements of future threshold implementation might thus 
be able to serve as such a coordinating device. 
Thus, the hypothesised mechanism through which announcements affect behaviour is through 
their impact on the expectations of individuals. In standard decision theory new information is 
incorporated into people‘s subjective probabilities estimates (expectations), so that probabilities 
are updated as new information is revealed, consistent with Bayes Theorem. This entails that 
peoples‘ expectations move consistent with the information that is presented as the theory of 
rational expectations predicts (Muth 1961). Yet it seems that in practice people find it difficult to 
perform perfect Bayesian reasoning, due to lack of an adequate mental model and the use of 
intuitive system of the mind that relies on heuristics and biases for quick judgments (Cole 1989; 
Van Raaij 1989; Kahneman 2011). This implies that the direction of the announcement effect 
depends crucially on how the announcement affects expectations, which might be hard to predict 
ex ante. Heim (2007) examines the impact of announcements of future tax rebates and find no 
announcement effect on total spending. Adams et al. (2001) study the consequences of 
announcements of future policy reform in pig farming practices and find a positive adjustment 
effect, but no long run adaptation effects. Blundell et al. (2011) find a positive adjustment effect 
of increased current labour force participation for single mothers in response to announcements 
of future in-work tax credit reforms.  
The financial markets literature has studied the announcement effect more than any other field. 
Several authors find evidence that announcements from central banks about monetary policy 
intentions, or even general policy stances induce widespread and quick reactions in financial 
markets (Urich & Wachtel 1981; Cornell 1983; Rosa & Verga 2008). The rapid effect of 
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announcements is facilitated through the impact on the higher-order expectations of analysts and 
expectations of the market in general (Brown & Han 1992; Kondor 2009). Demiralp & Jordá 
(2001) describe how the U.S Federal Reserve can control the federal funds rate just by 
announcing a new target, even without any open market operations, due to the announcement‘s 
effect on market expectations. 
The current paper seeks to be the first study to isolate the effects of announcements of a future 
institutional change under different framing and risk contexts. As such, it will utilise the 
experimental methodology in order to determine the announcements‘ impact on cooperation. 
This follows the work done by Visser et al. (2014) which was the first paper to explicitly look at 
the announcement effect. In this paper the authors made announcements of an impending 
transition to a peer-punishment institution in a public goods game and found that the 
announcements cause no adjustment effect, but cause a double adaptation effect: increased 
numbers of contributors partly mediated by increased use of the punishment institution. 
The paper will continue with section 3 giving a description of the methodology used for the 
experiments. After this, section 4 will provide an analysis of the main results found. Section 5 
will then discuss the implications of the results, particularly with regards to the climate change 
problem and section 6 will conclude. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Subjects and Design 
In total 309 students from the University of Cape Town (UCT) participated in the study over 
one week from the 7th of October to the 14th of October 2014. Subjects were seated at computer 
terminals using Z-tree Software (Fischbacher 2007), and randomly split into groups of 3 without 
knowing the identity their other group members. They were then asked to take part in 
anonymous choice experiments. It was made clear to subjects that they could earn money based 
on their choices during the experiment, which would last approximately 2 hours. Before the 
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experiment began subjects were given a show-up fee of R10 and after the experiment they were 
asked to complete a short demographic questionnaire1. Subjects earned on average R126.48. 
Once informed consent was given by all subjects, they were asked to complete two 5 choice 
gamble tasks with real financial stakes, in order to elicit risk and loss attitudes. This simple 
procedure follows the methodology of Eckel & Grossman (2008b), wherein subjects were faced 
with five 50/50 gambles, increasing in expected value and risk, and are asked to choose which 
gamble they would like to play. This method was chosen as its simplicity makes for an ideal pre-
experiment; even though this comes at the trade-off of cruder risk preference classification, this 
method has been shown to have low noise and good consistency with other measures (Dave et al. 
2010; Charness et al. 2013; Crosetto & Filippin 2013). Table 1 illustrates the design of the  
Table 1  Gamble-Choice Task with Expected Payoffs and Risk 












1 A 50 14 24   14 24 0 r>1.6 
B 50 14 24 
 
2 
A 50 24 34 
 
16 26 8 0.53<r<1.6 
B 50 8 18 
 
3 
A 50 34 44 
 
18 28 16 0.30<r<0.53 
B 50 2 12 
 
4 
A 50 44 54 
 
20 30 24 0.15<r<0.30 
B 50 -4 6 
 
5 
A 50 54 64 
 
22 32 32 r<0.15 
B 50 -10 0   
*Measured as standard deviation of expected payoff. 
**Calculated as the range of r in the function U=x(1−r)/(1−r) for which the subject chooses each gamble assuming constant 
relative risk aversion 
gamble-choice task. The method includes two frames: gains frame, where the gambles only 
contain outcomes of greater than or equal to zero; and a loss frame, where two of the riskiest 
gambles include the prospect of losing some or all of a subject‘s show-up fee. A rough 
estimation of loss aversion can then be revealed by comparing subjects‘ choices in the different 
                                                     
1 See Appendix A for demographic questionnaire  
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frames. Whereas Eckel & Grossman (2008b) utilised a between-subject design to measure the 
differences in loss and risk attitudes between men and women, we will utilise a within-subject 
design so that we have measures of risk and loss attitudes for each subject. In our experiment, the 
loss framed gamble-choice task was played first followed by the no-loss frame. Subjects were 
told that the choices they make in the gamble-choice experiments might result in the loss of some 
or all of the R10 show-up. Outcomes of the 50/50 gambles were then decided at the end of the 
session by the computers generating a random number for each subject. If that number was less 
than or equal to 0.5 then value A would be paid to the subject, otherwise value B was paid to the 
subject.  
Subsequently, subjects were told that they would now play interactive games for 30 periods. 
The design of the experiment was that subjects play 20 periods of standard voluntary 
contribution mechanism Public Goods Games (PGGs) then in the 21st period the game changes 
into a voluntary contribution Threshold Public Goods Game (TPGG), which is to be played for 
10 periods until period 30. The main intervention is to see what effect announcing the future 
institutional change has on subject behaviour. In treatments with announcements, the 
institutional change occurring in Period 21 is explained fully in Period 11 and then after Period 
20 again. Each period following Period 11 then incorporates a short announcement of the 
impending rule change on subjects‘ computer screens before play begins. This same design was  
Table 2  3x2 Between-Subject Design 
 Gains Frame Loss Frame 
 Certain Impact Certain Impact Risky Impact 
Announcement Treatment GCA (N=48) Treatment LCA (N=54) 
Treatment LRA 
 (N=57) 




tested in a gains framed environment; a loss framed environment; and then a loss framed 
environment with risk of loss in the TPGG phase if groups do not reach the threshold. Thus, we 
utilised a 3 (gains frame; loss frame; loss frame + risky impact) x 2 (announcement; no 
announcement) between-subject design, illustrated in Table 2. 
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3.1.1 PGG phase: Gains and Loss frames 
The gains-framed PGG works such that each group member (n=3) receives an endowment (E) 
of 20 tokens each period and must then decide how much to allocate to a private account (xi) 
yielding a return of 1 and how much to allocate to a group account (gi) (xi + gi = 20), which 
yields a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 0.5 for oneself and each other group member. To 
ease the explanation of the group account to subjects we used a similar method of instructions2 as 
Cox (2014), in which it is explained that the group account starts off with zero tokens each 
period, and each token allocated to the group account will be multiplied by 1.5 and then split 
equally among all three group members. At the end of each period in the gains-framed PGG, the 
payoff for an individual is represented by: 
 
πi      i )   





The loss-framed PGG is modelled similarly to the Public Bad games used by Andreoni 
(1995b) and Willinger & Ziegelmeyer (1999), except with different parameters and keeping 
contribution to the group account as the cooperative option and the focal point. Similarly to 
Cox's (2014) instructions we explained the loss-framed PGG to subjects by saying that the group 
account starts off with a 90 token deficit, and each token contributed to the group account is 
multiplied by 1.5 and then subtracted from the deficit. Any deficit remaining in the group 
account at the end of the period must then be paid for equally out of each group member‘s 
remaining private account. For this frame each group member (n=3) receives an extra 30 tokens 
of non-usable endowment each period, to ensure logical equivalence to the gains frame and to 
mimic an already endowed, untradeable benefit deriving from a public good – such as clean air 
to breathe. Subjects must still allocate their 20 tokens of usable endowment (E) between a private 
(xi) and a group account (gi). At the end of each period in the loss-framed PGG, the payoff for an 
individual is represented by: 
 
πi          )   





This equation is derived from manipulating equation (1) and by including a positive 30 and a 
negative 30 which cancel out. Investing into the group account (gi ), reduces the loss faced by the 
                                                     
2 Instructions available upon request from the Authors 
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group by 0.5, while allocating tokens to the private account yields a positive return of 1 for 
oneself only. 
In both the gains-framed and the loss-framed PGG the dominant strategy is to contribute 
nothing to the public good, yet the welfare maximising solution is achieved only by full 
contribution from all. Therefore, these two frames illustrate the quintessential element of framing 
effects, which is the presentation of logically equivalent options in semantically different ways 
(Krishnamurthy et al. 2001). 
3.1.2 TPGG phase: Gains and Loss frame 
The general design of the TPGG phase of the games combines a number of elements found 
consistently in the prevailing literature. The thresholds are cumulative in nature, meaning that the 
sum of total contributions to the public good needs to be at or above the threshold level by the 
end of the 30th period to avoid loss or gain reward (see for example: Milinski et al. 2008; 
Dannenberg et al. 2011; Tavoni et al. 2011). We also utilise a high threshold level of 75% of 
total contributable group endowment (T=450), which has been shown to decrease cooperation 
and make public good provision more difficult (Cadsby & Maynes 1999). Similar threshold 
levels are also found in Rapoport & Suleiman (1993),Coats & Neilson (2005) and McCarter et 
al. (2010). A high threshold is used in order to examine whether announcements can improve 
cooperation in a contextual situation which is known for its difficulty. Furthermore, the reward 
(loss) for reaching the threshold (not reaching the threshold) (v) is set at 300 tokens for each 
group member, in order to align the step return value (        
 
  to that which Croson & Marks 
(2000) find to be average in the literature and use in their experiments as the medium condition 
(S.R=2). We do not use any refund or rebate rules, so cumulative contributions below or above 
the threshold level are wasted. 
The gains-framed TPGG rewards groups (v) whose total contributions are greater than or equal 
to the threshold level after 10 periods. Each period, every group member (n=3) receives an 
endowment (E) of 20 tokens and must decide how much to allocate to a private account (xi) and 
how much to a joint account (gi). At the end of the 10 periods of the gains-framed TPGG, the 
payoff for an individual is shown by: 
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 πi  ∑            ∑                             ∑                    T (3) 
 πi  ∑            ∑                                  ∑                    T (4) 
The loss-framed TPGG works in a similar way to the loss-framed PGG in that subjects receive 
an extra, non-usable 30 tokens each period and a usable endowment (E) of 20 tokens that are 
investable into either xi or gi. However, in the loss-frame, groups who do not reach the threshold 
after 10 periods incur a loss (-v). The payoff for an individual in the loss-framed TPGG after 10 
periods is as follows: 
πi ∑          ∑            ∑                           ∑                    
 T (5) 
πi ∑          ∑            ∑                      ∑                    
 T (6) 
Both the loss-framed and the gains-framed TPGG are logically identical and entail dominant 
strategies of zero contribution if others‘ contributions are low enough, but also dominant 
strategies to cooperate such that the threshold is reached exactly. This entails multiple Nash 
Equilibria, as discussed earlier. In both of these TPGGs, expectations thus play an important role, 
as one will only contribute as much as one thinks will be pivotal in reaching the threshold given 
their expectations of the other group members contributions (McBride 2006). With such 
coordination possibilities inherent to TPGGs, we wish to examine what effect announcements of 
the future implementation of a threshold have on cooperative behaviour both before the change 
and after the change, and whether this effect is different depending on framing. 
3.1.3 Loss & Risk Framed TPGG 
The final variation in the treatments is the transition from a loss-framed PGG for 20 periods, 
into a loss-framed TPGG for 10 periods, where the negative impact from not reaching the 
threshold only exists with a certain probability (p). The decision to only use a loss-framed risk 
treatment is to maximise comparability with other studies utilising the same form of risk and also 
to more realistically model the prospects of a risk of dangerous climate change from tipping over 
a threshold, which incorporates elements of scientific uncertainty and environmental resilience 
uncertainty (Milinski et al. 2008; Hasson et al. 2010; Santos & Pacheco 2011; Tavoni et al. 




E(πi)= ∑          ∑            ∑                     ∑                    
 T (5) 
E(πi)=∑          ∑            ∑                  ∑                   T (6) 
The expected payoff function must be used as the situation involves risk. If there is no risk of a 
negative impact from not reaching the threshold (p=0) then there is a dominant strategy to 
contribute zero, but as the risk increases (p>0) there exist ever more Nash Equilibria at the total 
group account contribution level of the threshold. When the negative impact from not reaching 
the threshold exists with certainty (p=1) the strategy domain becomes that of the certain-impact 
loss-framed TPGG described in 3.1.2. In this treatment the risk of negative impact from not 
reaching the threshold is set at 50%, which is a risk rate used in Tavoni et al. (2011) and Milinski 
et al. (2008) and corresponds to a relatively low risk of impact and has been shown to increase 
the difficulty of public good provision. Whether the impact occurred for groups with cumulative 
contributions lower than the threshold level in period 30 was decided by the computer generating 
a random number for each group. If this random number was less than or equal to 0.5 then the 
negative impact existed and each group member lost 300 tokens; if the number was greater than 
0.5 then the negative impact did not occur and group members only lost the contributions they 
had invested into the group account over the 10 periods. 
4. Results 
4.1 Overview 
Table 3 provides some summary statistics for each treatment based on the demographic data 
from the survey. The different number of subjects in each treatment is due to varying 
participation rates on each treatment day. However, for each frame there is only a small, three-
person difference between the announcement and no-announcement treatments, so the results 
should be unaffected. The table provides evidence that there are no systematic variations 
between treatments with regards to demographics, yet in all subsequent individual-level 




Table 3 Summary Statistics 
Treatments GCN GCA LCN LCA LRN LRA All 
Number of 
Subjects 45 48 51 54 54 57 309 
Male 0.533 0.438 0.588 0.519 0.426 0.474 0.495 
[0.499] [0.496] [0.492] [0.500] [0.495] [0.499] [0.500] 
Black 0.556 0.625 0.706 0.685 0.815 0.684 0.683 
[0.497] [0.484] [0.456] [.465] [0.389] [0.465] [0.465] 
White 0.178 0.146 0.059 0.093 0.093 0.14 0.117 
[0.382] [0.353] [0.235] [0.290] [0.290] [0.347] [0.321] 
Coloured 0.089 0.125 0.098 0.111 0.019 0.053 0.081 
[0.285] [0.330] [0.297] [0.314] [0.135] [0.223] [0.273] 
Other Race 0.178 0.104 0.137 0.111 0.074 0.123 0.12 
[0.382] [0.306] [0.344] [0.314] [0.262] [0.328] [0.325] 
Below 24 years 
old 
0.822 0.896 0.941 0.963 0.944 0.912 0.916 
[0.382] [0.306] [0.235] [0.189] [0.229] [0.283] [0.278] 
 25 years old and 
older 
0.178 0.104 0.059 0.037 0.056 0.088 0.085 
[0.382 [0.306] [0.235] [0.189] [0.229] [0.283] [0.278] 
Humanities 0.378 0.313 0.196 0.093 0.13 0.404 0.25 
[0.485] [0.464] [0.397] [0.290] [0.336] [0.491] [0.433] 
Commerce 0.333 0.375 0.353 0.593 0.5 0.281 0.408 
[0.472] [0.484] [0.478] [0.492] [0.500] [0.449] [0.491] 
Other Faculty 0.289 0.313 0.451 0.315 0.37 0.316 0.343 
[0.453] [0.464] [0.498] [0.465] [0.483] [0.465] [0.475] 
High Income 0.044 0.042 0.098 0.056 0 0.018 0.042 
[0.206] [0.200] [0.297] [0.229] [0] [0.131] [0.201] 
Middle Income 0.6 0.542 0.51 0.611 0.611 0.579 0.576 
[0.490] [0.498] [0.500] [0.488] [0.488] [0.494] [0.494] 
Low Income 0.356 0.417 0.392 0.333 0.389 0.404 0.382 
[0.479] [0.493] [0.488] [0.472] [0.488] [0.491] [0.486] 
Smoker 0.133 0.146 0.137 0.148 0.093 0.105 0.126 
[0.340] [0.353] [0.344] [0.355] [0.290] [0.307] [0.332] 
Standard Deviations in square brackets 
The results from this experiment are divided into two parts. Section 4.2 looks at the findings 
from the two choices made in the gamble-choice tasks before the interactive public goods games. 
This will be followed by section 4.3 which discusses the announcement effect results from the 
interactive public goods games in different framing and risk contexts. 
4.2 Gamble-choice Task Results 
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Result 1: Males are less loss-averse than females. Furthermore, the subject pool in 
general is slightly risk-averse and loss-averse 
Appendix B shows histograms for the percent of subjects who choose each gamble-choice in 
both the loss framed and gains framed tasks. From these graphs it seems as though the prospect 
of losses in choice 4 and 5 in the loss framed task slightly increases subjects‘ risk-aversion. 
However, a two-sample means test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean choice from 
the two choice tasks are equal (p=0.3054) and an Epps-Singleton test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the choices in the two tasks have the same distribution (p=0.2503). 
Yet, because of the gamble-choices task within-subject design, looking at the average 
behaviour between subjects is of little help. What is more interesting is to see how the behaviour 
of individual subjects changed across the frames. In order to investigate this, we created a 
variable named the Loss-Aversion (LA) Index which is defined as a subject‘s gamble choice in 
the gains frame minus a subject‘s gamble choice in the loss frame and gives each subject a value 
between -4 and 4. A high LA index means an individual is more risk averse in the presence of 
losses; and a low LA index means an individual is less risk averse in the presence of losses. For 
the purposes of this paper loss aversion will be defined as increasingly risk-averse behaviour in 
the presence of loss prospects. 
The intuition behind this variable follows the logic of (Eckel & Grossman, 2008b) who state 
that a crude measure of loss aversion can be created by observing the difference in risk choice 
between the two frames. Both choices are logically equivalent and differ only in the prospect of 
potential losses in the final two choices in the loss frame, thus if choices ‗are the same in the 
[gains] treatment but differ in the loss treatment, then that would imply difference in loss 
aversion rather than risk aversion‘ (Eckel & Grossman, 2008b: 4). The structure of our within-
subject design may have caused ordering effects which can bias responses. However, because all 
subjects faced the same ordering effects we can still investigate relative differences in risk and 
loss attitudes between subjects.  




































Figure 1 Loss Aversion Index by Gender 
 Appendix C shows the results of Tobit regressions testing if any of the demographic variables 
are significant predictors of the two gamble choices and the LA index. All regressions contain 
robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. These regressions show that male is the 
most significant of the demographic variables, and therefore columns 4-6 include this as the only 
regressor to improve the fit of the models. The male variable is significantly and positively 
related to the loss framed gamble choice; insignificant in the gains framed gamble choice; and 
significantly and negatively related to the LA index. This implies that females are more risk 
averse in the presence of loss-prospects relative to males but have the similar risk preferences in 
the gains framed task, which equates to females being significantly more loss averse with respect 
to the constructed LA index. The average LA index value for a male is -0.13 while that for a 
female is 0.34 and a two sample means test confirms the difference is significant (p= 0.0081). 
Figure 1 presents a percentage histogram of the distribution of LA index values by gender. It can 
be seen that the most likely LA index value for a male is 0 while for a female it is 1, implying 
lower loss aversion amongst males. An Epps-Singleton test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
LA index values of males and females have the same distribution (p= 0.07798). 
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The finding that females are more risk averse than males seems to be quite widespread 
(Eckel & Grossman 2008b; Dave et al. 2010). However, Eckel & Grossman (2008b) find that 
females are significantly more risk averse in both the loss and gains framed tasks, which they 
interpret as the gender differences in choices not being driven by loss aversion alone. Yet 
Crosetto & Filippin (2013) argue that gender differences in risk attitudes are not as prevalent as 
many claim, and that behavioural differences across genders in situations of uncertainty are due 
to females being more loss averse rather than more risk averse. Indeed, these gender effects in 
loss aversion are also found in Schmidt & Traub (2002). Crosetto & Filippin (2013) attribute the 
misinterpretations as due to certain aspects of some elicitation methods, so it could be that 
changing Eckel & Grossman‘s (2008b) model into a within-subject design, as we have done 
here, increases its predictive accuracy, at least is ordinal terms. We also find that the mean LA 
index value for the subject population is 0.106 and the mean average gamble choice 
( ∑                       
 
         ) for the subject population is 2.6. These numbers imply that 
the subject pool is slightly loss averse (LA index>0) and risk averse with a CRRA coefficient of 
between 0.53 and 1.6 (refer to Table 1). Evidence for similar patterns of overall risk aversion in a 
sample population is also found in Holt & Laury (2002) and measured evidence for loss aversion 
is found in Abdellaoui et al. (2008), although the coefficients found in the latter are not 
comparable to the LA index coefficient here due to the ordering effects present in this study 
which render the variable mainly useful for relative comparisons. 
Our measures of risk preferences and our estimated LA index seem to tie in well with 
previous findings and thus may be seen as largely credible. We therefore feel confident to 
include them as estimators for subject behaviour in the subsequent analysis of the interactive 
games. This paper will be the first, to the authors‘ knowledge, to include measures of risk 
preferences and loss aversion as predictors of subject behaviour in differently framed public 
goods games. 
4.3 Announcement Effect in Interactive Public Goods Games 
The analysis of the announcement effect is split into two sections relating to the adjustment 
effect, before the implementation of the new institution, and the adaptation effect, after the 
implementation of the new institution. Section 4.3.1 will discuss the adjustment effect on current 
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subject behaviour in different framing and risk contexts. Section 4.3.2 will then explain the 
results of the adaptation effect, post-implementation of the TPGG rule change, in different 
framing and risk contexts. For each of the following results, the between-subject design of the 
interactive games will become apparent as the analysis will be conducted for each different 
frame separately between the announcement treatment and no-announcement treatment (refer to 
table 2). 
4.3.1 Adjustment Effect: Periods 11-20 
Result 2: There is no contribution adjustment effect in the gains frame or the loss-and-
risk frame, but there is a significant and positive contribution adjustment effect 
in the loss frame. 
In order to examine whether the announcements of a future rule change impact subject 
contribution behaviour before the actual implementation of the rule change, we initially ran some 
non-parametric tests on contribution levels. In both the gains frame (GCN/GCA) and the loss-
and-risk (LRN/LRA) framed public goods games, Kruskal-Wallis tests showed no significant 
differences between the contribution levels in the announcement and no-announcement 
treatments for the periods 11-20 (GCN/GCA: p=0.2530; LRN/LRA: p=0.3350). However, in the 
loss frame (LCN/LCA) the same Kruskal-Wallis test shows contribution to be significantly 
higher in LCA relative to LCN (p=0.0001). Figure 2, showing the average contribution per 
period in each treatment, also supports this finding as the average contribution per period in the 
loss frame with announcement seems to be considerably higher than that of the loss frame with 




















To further unpack these findings we ran tobit regressions for each framing context in tables 
4, 5 and 6. In each regression the dependent variable is contribution and demographic controls 
are included. All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. The variable 
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gamble choice in each of the tasks the lower one‘s estimated risk aversion coefficient, therefore 
the addition of each subject‘s two gamble choices can be seen as a rough measure of how much 
risk they are willing to accept. The main result from Tables 4, 5 and 6 is found in the dummy 
variable announcement. The announcements are made in the announcement treatments from 
period 11 onwards, therefore we do not expect the announcement and no-announcement 
treatments to be significantly different in periods 1-10 and this is included in the tables as a 
baseline. The adjustment effect would therefore be evidenced by significant differences in 
contribution behaviour during periods 11-20.  
In both the gains (Table 4) and the loss-and-risk frame (Table 6), the announcement dummy 
is insignificant in both periods 1-10 and 11-20, implying that the announcement does not cause 
any contribution adjustment effects. However, in the loss frame (Table 5) we see that the 
announcement causes a large, positive and very significant (p= 0.000) impact on contribution. In 
the loss frame, receiving the announcement increases the average contribution amount by 4.693  
Table 4 Gains Frame: Contribution Adjustment Effects3 
 Dependent Variable: Contribution 
Independent Variables Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 
   
Lagged sum of others‘ contribution 0.230*** 0.323*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0480) 
Announcement (GCA) 0.753 0.821 
 (1.133) (1.234) 
Sum of Gamble choices -0.369 -0.196 
 (0.339) (0.332) 
Loss Aversion index (LA) 0.704 0.276 
 (0.428) (0.479) 
Period -0.525*** -0.653*** 
 (0.135) (0.142) 
Constant 4.814** 11.79*** 
 (2.414) (3.194) 
   
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes 
Observations 837 930 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0233 0.0367 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                     
3 The significance of results from all the regressions described in this paper are robust to the exclusion of the Loss 
Aversion index variable and the Sum of Gamble choices variable. 
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Table 5 Loss Frame: Contribution Adjustment Effects 
 Dependent Variable: Contribution 
Independent Variables Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 
   
Lagged sum of others‘ contribution 0.286*** 0.478*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0584) 
Announcement (LCA) 1.744 4.693*** 
 (1.269) (1.318) 
Sum of Gamble choices -0.523 -0.342 
 (0.324) (0.361) 
Loss Aversion index (LA) -0.311 -0.582 
 (0.378) (0.432) 
Period -0.519*** -0.555*** 
 (0.147) (0.167) 
Constant 4.271 6.030 
 (2.920) (4.520) 
   
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes 
Observations 945 1,050 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0303 0.0633 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6 Loss & Risk Frame: Contribution Adjustment Effects 
 Dependent Variable: Contribution 
Independent Variables Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 
   
Lagged sum of others‘ contribution 0.226*** 0.278*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0522) 
Announcement (LRA) -0.279 -0.809 
 (1.124) (1.526) 
Sum of Gamble choices -0.225 0.0842 
 (0.276) (0.397) 
Loss Aversion index (LA) -0.312 -0.657 
 (0.333) (0.597) 
Period -0.464*** -0.476*** 
 (0.113) (0.115) 
Constant 7.549*** 7.321* 
 (2.672) (3.887) 
   
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes 
Observations 999 1,110 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0238 0.0186 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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in periods 11-20, ceteris paribus. It is also important to see that the announcement variable is not 
significant for periods 1-10 in the loss frame, as this was before the announcements began in 
period 11, indicating that without the announcement these two treatments have no significant 
differences in contributions. 
Interesting to note is that for all three tables the variable lagged sum of others’ contribution, 
which is how much the rest of one‘s group contributed in the previous period, is positive and 
significant at the 1% level for periods 1-10 and 11-20. This implies that a highly important 
predictor of one‘s current contribution in all frames is how much the rest of one‘s group 
contributed in the previous period. Neither the sum of gamble choices nor the LA index variables 
show any real significance in any of the tables. However, it is interesting to see that the sign of 
the LA index is positive in the gains frame (Table 4) and negative in the two loss frames (Tables 
5 & 6). This suggests that loss aversion might work differently depending on the frame, and 
might be a part of the explanation of framing effects. 
Result 3: In the loss frame, the announcement significantly increases the likelihood of a 
subject being a full cooperator and significantly decreases the likelihood of a 
subject being a free rider. However, in the gains and loss-and-risk frame there 
is no evidence of any such player strategy adjustment effects. 
In order to be a full cooperator a subject must have contributed their full endowment of 20 
tokens to the group account for the period; and in order to be a free rider a subject must have 
contributed 0 tokens to the group account. We created a dummy variable for each of these two 
player types, equal to 1 if their definition is met and equal to 0 if not. To see if the announcement 
changes the likelihood of a subject being either a full cooperator or a free rider in each of the 
three different framing contexts we employed Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric tests and a series 
of logit regressions in Appendices D, E and F. Four regressions were run for each frame: periods 
1-10 and 11-20 with the dependent variable the dummy for being a full cooperator; and periods 
1-10 and 11-30 with the dependent variable the dummy for being a free rider. All regressions 
report logit coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. In the gains 
frame Kruskal-Wallis tests find no significant differences between the GCN and GCA treatment 
with regards to the numbers of full cooperators (p=0.6886) and the numbers of free riders 
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(p=0.8848) for periods 11-20. This is confirmed by Appendix D which shows the announcement 
dummy to be an insignificant predictor on the likelihood of an average subject being either a full 
cooperator or a free rider.  
In the context of the loss frame, initial Kruskal-Wallis tests for the periods 11-20 indicate that 
the announcement has a significant and positive influence on the numbers of full cooperators 
(p=0.0001) and a significant and negative impact on the numbers of free riders (p=0.0001). This 
finding is supported by Appendix E, which also shows that the announcement dummy is only 
significant in each regression for periods 11-20, after the announcements have been made. The 
marginal effects of the announcement in the loss frame increase the likelihood that the average 
subject is a full cooperator by 4.03% (p= 0.032) and decrease the likelihood that the average 
subject is a free rider by 14.25% (p= 0.012). 
Kruskal-Wallis tests for the loss-and-risk frame suggest no significant differences in the 
number of free riders (p= 0.2706) between LRN and LRA, but significantly less full cooperators 
in LRA (p= 0.0030) in periods 11-20. The logit regressions in Appendix F corroborate the 
insignificant impact of the announcement with regards to the likelihood of free riders, but do not 
support the finding of the announcement having any significant effect on the likelihood of full 
cooperators. This shows that once other variables are controlled for, the announcement does not 
have any significant adjustment effect on the likelihood of player-types in the loss-and-risk 
frame.  
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the percentage of subjects playing as a free rider or full 
cooperator in each period for periods 11-20. The patterns shown in this graph support the initial 
Kruskal-Wallis tests, especially with regards to the largest effect of the announcements on player 
strategies being in the loss framed context. These findings imply that the announcement‘s 
positive adjustment effect of higher contributions found in the loss frame in Result 2 is driven by 
the announcement causing significantly more people to fully cooperate and significantly fewer 
people to completely free-ride. One might see this as the announcement causing greater overall 
cooperation in the loss frame. This interpretation is also strengthened by the fact that there are no 
contribution adjustment effects for the announcements in the gains and loss-and-risk frames and, 
correspondingly, no player-type adjustment effects for either of these two frames.  
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Figure 3 Evolution of Player Strategies in Periods 11-20 
 
In terms of climate change, results 1 and 2 imply that announcements of future climate 
thresholds can influence country emission abatement behaviour positively. However, it is 
important that the announcements are framed in the loss context, emphasising how cooperation 
can reduce the losses faced by all. Perhaps the positive adjustment effects on contribution are the 
result of group members using the announcement as information of the necessity of future 
coordination, and thus they use Period 11-20 as a mock-trial: increasing their cooperation to test 
whether their group will be able to reach the threshold by the end of ten periods when it counts. 
In other words, maybe people reason to themselves: ‗I will use the next ten periods as a test to 
see whether, if I cooperate fully, my group members will join me and we can reach the amount 
of required cooperation before the rule change, thus signalling our coordination intentions for 



















































































Evolution of Full cooperators in Periods 11-20
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thresholds are vital for society to test how much each country is willing to cooperate to signal 
their commitment to avoiding devastation when the time comes 
4.3.2 Adaptation Effect – Periods 21-30 
Result 4: The announcement significantly increases the likelihood of groups reaching the 
threshold after the implementation of the new rules in the loss frame. However, 
the announcement significantly decreases the likelihood of groups reaching the 
threshold in the gains frame; and the announcement has no significant impact 
on the probability of groups reaching the threshold in the loss-and-risk frame. 
Figure 2 shows that the implementation of the threshold rules, beginning in period 21, results 
in significantly increasing the average contribution per period in all treatments. This rise in 
contribution is to be expected, as the threshold game reduces the conflict between individual and 
collective interests inherent to the normal public goods game; and implies increased benefit to 
the individual for coordinated cooperation (Cadsby & Maynes 1999; Abele et al. 2010). 
However, the trends between the announcement and no-announcement treatments in Figure 2 
also seem to suggest that the announcement is causing increased contribution in the loss frame, 
decreased contribution in the gains frame, and no real impact in the loss-and-risk frame. Kruskal-
Wallis tests confirm the significance of these announcement effects on contribution in the gains 
frame (p=0.0166) and the loss frame (p= 0.0001) and the insignificant effects in the loss-and-risk 
frame (p= 0.8239).  
Table 7 Groups that reached the threshold by treatment and announcement 























Gains Frame 15 8 53.33% 16 5 31.25% 
Loss Frame 17 7 41.18% 18 11 61.11% 
Loss & Risk 






















Figure 4 Percentage of Groups reaching the threshold in each treatment 
Table 7 and Figure 4 show that these announcement effects on contribution in the gains and 
loss frames correspond to similar patterns in the number of groups who reach or exceed the 
threshold in period 30. It can be seen that in the announcement treatment 22.08% fewer groups 
reaching the threshold relative to the no-announcement treatment in the gains frame. Whereas the 
announcement treatments in the loss and the loss-and-risk frames results 19.93% and 9.36%, 
respectively, more groups reaching the threshold compared to the no-announcement treatments. 
These adaptation effects of announcements on the likelihood of reaching the threshold in 
period 30 are further explored in logit regressions reporting coefficients with robust standard 
errors clustered at the individual level (Appendix G). Announcements in the gains frame seem to 
result in a significantly lower likelihood (p = 0.011) of a group reaching the threshold on 
average, while in a loss frame they seem to result in a significantly higher likelihood (p= 0.045) 
of a group reaching the threshold on average. In the loss-and-risk frame, the slightly higher 
percentage of groups reaching the threshold seen in the announcement treatment in Figure 4 is 
shown to not be significant (p= 0.181). 
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 Average Threshold Required per Period 
However, the models in appendix G all suffer from a rather small sample size, ranging from 
93 to 111 subjects, because the sample has been limited to only looking at period 30 of the 
threshold public goods game. Consequently, the Wald chi2 statistics for all of these regressions is 
small, meaning that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the independent variables 
have no effect on the likelihood of reaching the threshold in period 30. Therefore, in order to be 
more confident about the results from appendix G, we ran new logit regressions in Table 8 using 
a larger sample size.  
This was done by changing the dependent variable to a dummy variable (Average Threshold 
Required) that equals 1 if a group reached or exceeded the average required group account 
contributions per period (AT) to reach the threshold in period 30 (AT = 45 tokens). This number 
is what a group must contribute each period on average in order to reach the threshold level of 
450 cumulative group account contributions by the end of the 10 periods of the threshold public 
goods game. With the use of this dependent variable, the regressions could then be run over the 
periods 21-30 which considerably increases the sample size. Table 8 reports logit coefficients 
with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level and each regression includes 
demographic control variables. 
The results in Table 8 corroborate the findings in appendix G. The announcements in a loss 
frame context result in a significantly higher likelihood of an average individual‘s group 
reaching the average required threshold per period. Whereas the announcements in the gains 
frame context results in a significantly lower likelihood of an average individual‘s group 
reaching the average required threshold per period. Finally, in the loss-and-risk frame the 
announcement has no significant impact. The marginal effects for the announcement in the loss 
frame are such that being in the announcement treatment causes the average individual to be 
12.03% more likely to be in a group that reaches or exceeds the 45 token average required group 
account contribution per period; while being in the announcement treatment in the gains frame 
decreases the average individuals probability of being in a group that exceeds the 45 token 
required average by 16.57% per period. These adaptation effects in both the loss and gains 
frames are significant at the 5% level. The models in Table 8 also exhibit better overall 
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prediction for the variation in the dependent variable, with each regression having a high Wald 
chi2 statistic.  
Table 8 Likelihood of Reaching the Average Threshold per Period in Different Frames 
 Dependent Variable: Average Threshold Required 
for periods 21-30 (0/1) 
 
Independent Variables Gains Frame Loss Frame 
Loss and Risk 
Frame 
    
Lagged Sum of Contributions 0.0873*** 0.0943*** 0.118*** 
 (0.00950) (0.00711) (0.00888) 
Announcement -0.670** 0.509** 0.370 
 (0.270) (0.227) (0.256) 
Loss Aversion (LA) Index  -0.211** -0.0147 0.134* 
 (0.0874) (0.0703) (0.0775) 
Sum of Gamble Choices 0.145** -0.0537 0.0795 
 (0.0727) (0.0603) (0.0665) 
Period -0.141*** -0.148*** -0.108*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0253) (0.0300) 
Constant -0.259 -0.456 -3.022*** 
 (1.005) (0.893) (0.961) 

















Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.2886 0.2851 0.3957 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The effects of the loss aversion and risk preference variables are not consistent throughout 
the frames. In the gains frame, higher levels of loss aversion and risk aversion appear to diminish 
the probability of an average individual being in a group that reaches the average group account 
contribution required per period, both significant at the 5% level. While in the loss frame both 
the variables have little of both practical and statistical significance. Then in the loss-and-risk 
frame only the loss aversion variable is significant (at the 10% level) and suggests that higher 
levels of loss aversion relate to a higher likelihood of an average individual being in a group that 
reaches the average required group account contributions per period, which is the opposite of the 
effect found in the gains frame.  
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As a brief aside, one might wonder whether there is any difference between the groups that 
were successful in reaching the threshold in Period 30 without announcements and those that did 
it after being forewarned with announcements. Appendix H shows the graphs of the average 
group account contribution per period for groups that succeeded in reaching the threshold across 
frames and whether or not they received the announcements. The trends from the graphs seem to 
show that in the loss frame and the loss-and-risk frame, successful groups that received 
announcements made stronger, earlier cooperative action relative to successful groups that did 
not receive the announcement. This is reinforced by Kruskal-Wallis tests on total group account 
contributions per period between no-announcement treatments and announcement treatments for 
the first half of the threshold phase (periods 21- 25) in both the loss frame (p=0.0023) and the 
loss-and-risk frame (p=0.0011). This effect of strong, early action in successful groups is not 
present in the gains frame (p=0.2368). However, this finding must be tempered by the 
observation that in both the loss and the loss-and-risk frames, the announcement treatments have 
more successful groups and this might be biasing the Kruskal-Wallis tests. Nevertheless, such 
adaptation effects of strong, early action due to announcements have been found in Visser et al. 
(2014) who find that announcements of future punishment opportunities result in the increased 
and more effective early-utilisation of the punishment institution, once it is implemented. 
Result 3 implies that early warnings of climate change, when made in a loss frame, can 
significantly improve society‘s chances of avoiding a dangerous future climate threshold, relative 
to an unannounced discovery of future climate thresholds, by incentivising increased cooperation 
and coordination. Possibly this increased cooperation is due to the announcements increasing 
people‘s estimation of their contribution being pivotal and necessary to make the difference. The 
important role of subjective expectations of being pivotal have been well noted (e.g. (Rapoport & 
Eshed-Levy 1989; McBride 2006; Makris 2009; McBride 2010). This feeling of being pivotal 
might also explain the observation of stronger, early action by groups forewarned with 
announcements. This would have major implications for climate change policy, especially 
considering the importance that The Stern Review places on strong, early action in order to solve 
global warming (Tol & Yohe 2006) and the positive effects that early signals of cooperative 
intent have on the successful provision of threshold public goods in sequential games 
(Dannenberg et al. 2011; Normann & Rau 2011). 
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Result 5: The adaptation effects of the announcement on the likelihood of groups 
reaching the threshold in the gains and loss frames may be driven by the 
announcement’s impact on particular player strategies. The announcement in 
the gains frame seems to diminish the amount of subjects contributing 
according to a fair-share principle. Whereas the announcement in the loss 
frame seems to increase the number of subjects playing as altruists and 
diminish the numbers of those playing as free-riders. 
In trying to uncover the announcements‘ adaptation effects on player types, we constructed 
three different player type variables: altruist, fair-sharer and free-rider. A free-rider is defined as 
a subject who contributes zero tokens to the public account for the period. A fair-sharer is 
defined as a subject who contributes their fair share of the average required group account 
contribution per period, which is 45 tokens shared equally amongst all three group members 
(AT/3 = 15 tokens). An altruist is defined as a subject that contributes anything more than their 
fair share; anything greater than 15 tokens. 
Initial Kruskal-Wallis tests for the periods 21-30 suggested that the announcement in the loss 
frame lead to significantly more instances of subjects being altruists (p=0.0104) and significantly 
fewer instances of subjects free-riding (p=0.0001). While Kruskal-Wallis tests for the same 
periods in the gains frame suggested that the announcement causes significantly more instances 
of subjects being free-riders (p=0.0093) and significantly fewer instances of subjects being fair-
sharers (p=0.0002). Looking at graphs of the evolution of the percentage of these player types in 
each frame by announcement seems to support the findings of the Kruskal-Wallis tests 
(Appendices I and J).  
However, logit regressions on different player type for the gains and loss frames in tables 9 
and 10 provide less conclusive evidence for the importance of announcements as predictors of 
player types in periods 21-30. In the loss frame the announcement‘s positive impact on the 
likelihood of altruists and negative impact on the likelihood of free-riders is only significant at 
the 14% level (p= 0.133 and p=0.130 respectively). While in the gains frame the announcement‘s 
negative impact on the likelihood of fair-sharers is only significant at the 11% level (p=0.104), 
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Table 9 Loss Frame: Likelihood of Player Type in periods 21-30 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables Free-rider (0/1) Fair-sharer (0/1) Altruist (0/1) 
    
Lagged Sum of Contributions -0.117*** 0.0368*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.0149) (0.00772) (0.0115) 
Announcement -0.585 0.0893 0.466 
 (0.386) (0.299) (0.310) 
Loss Aversion Index (LA) -0.0982 -0.0490 -0.105 
 (0.125) (0.0935) (0.0957) 
Sum of Individual‘s Gamble 
Choices 
0.0170 -0.163** 0.0271 
 (0.0861) (0.0698) (0.0678) 
Period 0.293*** -0.179*** 0.0243 
 (0.0415) (0.0243) (0.0320) 
Constant -4.283*** 2.964*** -3.742*** 
 (1.386) (0.880) (1.076) 
    
















  57.96 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.4049 0.1025 0.1227 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
and its positive impact on the likelihood of free-riders is insignificant (p= 0.479). The lower 
significance of the announcement dummies found in these regressions implies that once other 
variables are controlled for, announcements do not seem to have as much impact on the 
likelihood of an average individual being a particular player type.  
However, (apart from free-riders in the gains frame) the announcement variables still retain 
some significance, which might be an indication that some of the adaptation effects on the 
likelihood of reaching thresholds found in the gains and loss frame are driven by the 
announcements having a slight impact on player strategies. These patterns in player strategy and 
probability of reaching the threshold are quite harmonious. In the gains frame, the 
announcements lead to lower likelihoods of reaching the threshold, and this might be partly 
mediated by the announcements causing less people to play the strategy of fair-sharing. While in 
the loss frame, the announcements increase the likelihood of reaching the threshold, and this 
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could be somewhat due to the announcement decreasing the likelihood of players free-riding and 
increasing the likelihood of players acting as altruists. 
Table 10 Gains Frame: Likelihood of Player Type in periods 21-30 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables Free-rider (0/1) Fair-sharer (0/1) Altruist (0/1) 
    
Lagged Sum of Contributions -0.0848*** 0.0420*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0111) (0.00770) 
Announcement 0.277 -0.527 0.000995 
 (0.391) (0.324) (0.290) 
Loss Aversion Index (LA) 0.133 -0.138 0.0758 
 (0.152) (0.116) (0.106) 
Sum of Individual‘s Gamble 
Choices 
-0.166 0.0396 0.143** 
 (0.152) (0.0778) (0.0667) 
Period 0.223*** -0.171*** 0.0439 
 (0.0453) (0.0284) (0.0345) 
Constant -5.006*** 3.608*** -4.204*** 
 (1.493) (0.952) (0.954) 
    

















Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0055 
Pseudo R2 0.2295 0.1074 0.0651 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5. Discussion 
The results as a whole from the experiment presented in this paper suggest that early warning 
announcements can have a significant impact on cooperation and the efficiency of behaviour in 
light of future institutional change. Important insights for the climate policy debate with respect 
to how announcements should be framed are also found. 
The lack of consistent significance of the loss aversion (LA index) and risk preference 
variables (sum of gamble choices) throughout the results is an interesting aside. This could 
indicate that these individual-level variables are not important predictors of individual 
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contribution behaviour in a group context or the probability of a group reaching the threshold. 
Perhaps what might be more fruitful for further research would be the use of group level 
variables for aggregate risk preferences and loss aversion seeing as decisions are made within the 
context of a continuing group identity. One would especially think that in the loss-and-risk 
treatment there should be more significance for the risk preference variable than found here. 
Conversely, it could be the case that the Eckel & Grossman (2008b) elicitation method, as used 
here,  is not an accurate measure of these risk and loss attitudes. Future research could test this 
hypothesis by using different elicitation methods. However, this caveat is separate from the focus 
of the current paper which is to determine the effect of announcements of future institutional 
change. 
It appears as though the context in which announcements of future institutional change are 
made significantly affects their impact on people‘s behaviour. When the situation is framed in 
the gains domain, the announcements do not have any impact on the cooperative behaviour of 
individuals before the new institution is implemented (adjustment effect), but has the negative 
impact of significantly reducing the likelihood that groups will meet the required threshold after 
the new institution has begun (adaptation effect). There is weak evidence that this is partly 
working through announcements reducing the number of subjects playing the fair-share strategy 
and increasing the levels of free-riders. 
 On the other hand, when the context is framed in the loss domain, the announcements cause 
positive adjustment effects in the form of significantly higher contributions, mediated through 
increasing the instances of full-cooperators and diminishing the instances of free-riders. 
Additionally, once the new institution is implemented, those groups previously warned through 
announcements face positive adaptation effects of significantly higher likelihoods of reaching the 
required threshold level of contributions. These adaptation effects may be working through the 
announcements‘ impact on extreme player types: causing greater numbers of altruists and fewer 
free-riders, but the inconclusive nature of this evidence means we cannot properly reject the 
alternative explanation of the announcements‘ adaptation effects being due to increased general 
overall cooperativeness and coordination. 
42 
 
Our third context supports the findings in the previous literature on collective-risk social 
dilemmas by showing that the inclusion of impact risk in the loss frame reduces contributions 
and the numbers of groups reaching the threshold, from 41.18% to 22.22%. Our results also 
show the negative impact of risk on the effectiveness of announcements in the loss frame. The 
inclusion of the 50% probability of a negative impact if group contributions do not meet the 
threshold in the 30th period causes the announcements to have no significant adjustment or 
adaptation effects. This result has implications for future research to tease out what 
psychological element about announcements containing uncertain information causes the 
negation of the adjustment and adaptation effects.  
A natural application of this research is the efficacy of early warning systems in the climate 
change debate. An integral part of early warning systems is the dissemination of timely 
information in order to enable threatened individuals to prepare and act so as to reduce the 
possibility of harm (UNISDR 2010). This information dissemination can be seen as a series of 
announcements, such as those described in the current paper. Numerous studies have attested to 
the possibility and the benefits of early warning systems with regards to the negative impacts of 
tipping over dangerous climate thresholds, in particular the two degree Celsius warming 
threshold (Lenton 2011; Rogers & Tsirkunov 2011; Huntingford et al. 2012; Marvin et al. 2013; 
Ludescher et al. 2014). Alfieri et al. (2012) attribute a large degree of the benefits of early 
warning systems to increased population preparedness and coordination, as well as a necessary 
philosophical perspective change from post-disaster recovery to disaster prevention. However, 
what is lacking from the literature is a focus on how early warning initiatives can actually affect 
individual-level cooperative decisions; it has even been stated that ‗the individual‘s willingness 
to act cannot be taken for granted‘ (Rogers & Tsirkunov 2011: 14). The current study is an initial 
probe into this void in the literature. The climate change debate and announcements of future 
tipping points have naturally been spoken of in the loss frame, and our results show that this is 
the most advantageous way to frame announcements of future thresholds: with positive 
adjustment and adaptation effects resulting. However, less optimistic is the diluting effect of risk. 
It seems that if we cannot convince people of the certainty of disaster if the climate temperature 
threshold is exceeded, then announcements will have no impact. This is particularly worrisome 
in a debate that is already fraught with much ambiguity, scientific uncertainty and impact 
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asymmetry; never mind the ethical issues of unequal historical emissions responsibilities 
(Lorenzoni et al. 2005; Lobell & Burke 2008; Tavoni et al. 2011; Marvin et al. 2013). 
2015‘s 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Paris might serve as an ideal arena to 
implement the insights of this study. The conference will attempt to be the first climate meeting 
to place legally binding obligations for countries to reduce their emissions so as to avoid global 
temperature warming by more than 2 degrees Celsius. Fair and equitable emissions targets are to 
be devised in the 2015 conference and come into full force by 2020 (European Commission 
2013). This institutional context almost perfectly mimics the experiment performed in this paper. 
2015 will act as period 11 in the experiment, where an announcement of the future 
implementation of binding emissions targets in five years‘ time is made. The year 2020 will then, 
correspondingly, be like period 21 in the experiment, when the new institution is implemented. It 
is our belief that the legally binding nature of the agreements could overcome the impact 
uncertainty (of actual climate change) that we have shown to be problematic for the efficacy of 
announcements. This is because they might be formulated so that if countries do not reach their 
emission-abatement targets, severe sanctions can be applied from an international body in order 
to increase the certainty of negative impacts. The preceding experimental results suggest that if 
we use the agreed targets that will be made in 2015 as consistent and pervasive announcements 
of future change, we will reap the benefits of increased cooperation both before and after 2020. 
While the discussion has been framed in terms of how announcements could benefit the 
climate change problem, we have so far just assumed that our results are externally valid in such 
a real-world context. Although it would be widen the scope of the analysis contained in this 
paper too much to include, it is worth considering what type of empirical data could help justify 
the inference of our results onto the international climate dilemma. There are a number of 
potential sources for such data. The number of countries who originally pledged emissions 
reductions at the Kyoto Protocol or the point at which they actually made signed obligations 
could be investigated. Additionally, country specific rates of renewable energy adoption or the 
introductions of national policies to foster CO2 reductions might also serve as proxies for 
cooperation levels with regards to the climate change dilemma. These cooperation proxies could 
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then be graphed on a time scale in relation to clear climate change threshold announcements, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol or the COP 21 or various widely publicized scientific reports. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper makes a unique contribution to the economics literature by being only the second 
study on the impact of announcements of future institutional changes, and the first using the 
transition to a threshold public goods game structure. This represents a shift towards the use of 
announcements as exogenously given, credible informational interventions. As such it provides 
necessary evidence on the influence that such announcements have on changing peoples‘ 
expectations and consequently their behaviour. This study is also the first, to the authors‘ 
knowledge, that utilizes a pre-experiment to elicit risk attitudes and subsequently construct crude 
loss aversion measures which are then used as predictors of subject behaviour in public goods 
games. 
Our results show that announcements of future institutional change can increase the 
effectiveness of institutional change if the situation is framed in the correct way. If the context of 
the situation is framed in the loss domain, announcements cause positive adjustment and 
adaptation effects. Whereas if the situation is framed in the gains frame then announcements 
cause zero adjustment effects and negative adaptation effects; and if the loss framed context 
includes impact risk in the threshold institution the announcements have no adjustment or 
adaptation effects. We also find evidence that within groups that are successful in reaching the 
threshold in the loss and loss-and-risk framed contexts announcements lead to stronger, earlier 
cooperative action. 
Future research could delve deeper into testing whether forewarning people with 
announcements truly does result in stronger, earlier action. Additionally, there seems to be scope 
for future research to test the announcement effect in ever widening contextual situations, such 
as different classifications of institutional change or testing slight nuances in the wording of the 
announcements. This indeed seems to be a research gap in the literature, wherein expectations 
changing rationally on the basis of relevant information is assumed. Yet exactly how 
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expectations change and under what circumstances and the differing consequences thereof has 
been largely neglected. 
The findings of this paper have important implications for the climate change debate; 
providing optimism but also a caution. We find that announcements have the most positive 
impact on the effectiveness of institutional change in the loss frame, and this bodes well for the 
current scientific announcements of future climate thresholds as they have been, and are most 
naturally, explained in terms of loss minimization. However, we also see that introducing risk of 
loss, rather than certain loss, from not reaching the threshold negates the positive announcement 
effects. The lesson that climate policy-makers must heed from this is that impact certainty needs 
to be made explicit if the current announcements of dangerous climate tipping points are to have 
any effect. Otherwise, perhaps a global international body with a large amount of sanctioning 
power can be created in order to increase the certainty of negative impacts for those nations who 
do not reach their emissions abatement targets. This information is particularly valuable in light 
of the COP 21 in Paris in 2015 where nations will, for the first time, sign legally binding 
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Appendix A – Demographics Survey 
Demographic Questionnaire 
1. Experiment Number:     
 









☐ Prefer not to answer 
Other:       
 
4. What is your age? 
☐ 18-24 years old 
☐ 25-30 years old 
☐ 31-35 years old 
☐ 36 years and older 
 
5. In which faculty are you registered? 
☐ Commerce 
☐ Engineering and the Built Environment (EBE) 





6. Which income group do you belong to? 
☐ Low income 
☐ Middle income 
☐ High income 
 






















































Male 0.620*** -0.0946 -0.501** 0.596*** -0.0980 -0.489*** 
 (0.227) (0.237) (0.196) (0.227) (0.226) (0.182) 
Black -0.679* -1.078*** -0.253 - - - 
 (0.352) (0.323) (0.304)    
White -0.834* -0.564 0.145 - - - 
 (0.504) (0.467) (0.418)    
Coloured -0.671 -1.216** -0.353 - - - 
 (0.509) (0.501) (0.400)    
Below 24 years old 0.168 -0.0493 -0.155 - - - 
 (0.447) (0.409) (0.334)    
Commerce 0.223 0.151 -0.0733 - - - 
 (0.273) (0.257) (0.241)    
Humanities -0.110 0.150 0.239 - - - 
 (0.299) (0.308) (0.235)    
High income group 1.375* 0.528 -0.521 - - - 
 (0.818) (0.915) (0.623)    
Low Income group 0.181 0.159 -0.00758 - - - 
 (0.224) (0.237) (0.189)    
Smoker 0.137 -0.117 -0.207 - - - 
 (0.309) (0.326) (0.244)    
Constant 2.316*** 3.353*** 0.698 2.070*** 2.574*** 0.344*** 















Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309 
F Stat 1.50 1.43 1.35 6.89 0.19   7.18 
Prob > F 0.1392 0.1672 0.2032 0.0091 0.665 0.0078 
Pseudo R2 0.0169 0.0122 0.0117 0.0067 0.0002 0.0061 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 








Appendix D - Gains Frame: Player Types Adjustment Effects 
 Full Cooperator (0/1) Free Rider (0/1) 
Independent Variables Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 
Lagged others‘ contributions 0.0172 0.0420*** -0.0418*** -0.0664*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.00941) (0.0117) 
Announcement (GCA) 0.451 -0.0922 -0.270 -0.0802 
 (0.340) (0.364) (0.235) (0.276) 
Loss Aversion Index (LA) 0.0789 0.0436 -0.153* -0.0882 
 (0.166) (0.155) (0.0828) (0.0992) 
Sum of Gamble choices -0.0887 0.0795 0.0911 0.0877 
 (0.0694) (0.0929) (0.0732) (0.0760) 
Period -0.110** -0.0778 0.106*** 0.145*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0567) (0.0294) (0.0281) 
Constant -2.343*** -2.392*** -1.422*** -2.905*** 
 (0.813) (0.924) (0.518) (0.708) 
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 837 930 837 930 
Wald chi2 40.66 24.84    47.28 73.22 
Prob > chi2   0.0002 0.0362 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0780 0.0612 0.0671 0.1211 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 












Appendix E - Loss Frame: Player Types Adjustment Effects 
 Full Cooperator (0/1) Free Rider (0/1) 
Independent Variables Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 
Lagged others‘ contributions 0.0179 0.0630*** -0.0443*** -0.0691*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0142) (0.00882) (0.00961) 
Announcement (LCA) 0.477 0.805** -0.251 -0.588** 
 (0.359) (0.379) (0.231) (0.237) 
Loss Aversion Index (LA) -0.0970 -0.0369 0.0463 0.107 
 (0.109) (0.122) (0.0631) (0.0732) 
Sum of Gamble Choices 0.000154 0.223** 0.0836 0.111* 
 (0.0768) (0.0964) (0.0624) (0.0636) 
Period -0.0914* -0.105* 0.0877*** 0.0759*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0565) (0.0273) (0.0251) 
Constant -2.131*** -2.438* -0.584 -0.868 
 (0.765) (1.259) (0.579) (0.699) 
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 945 1,050 945 1,050 
Wald chi2 23.08 53.75 69.28 83.35 
Prob > chi2 0.0589 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0721 0.2174 0.0833   0.1466 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 













Appendix F - Loss & Risk Frame: Player Types Adjustment Effects 
 Full Cooperator (0/1) Free Rider (0/1) 
Independent Variables Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 
Lagged others‘ contributions 0.0138 0.0171 -0.0517*** -0.0454*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.00933) (0.0102) 
Announcement (LRA) -0.252 -0.652 -0.0565 0.0469 
 (0.326) (0.424) (0.222) (0.266) 
Loss Aversion Index (LA) 0.0268 -0.0970 0.0202 0.0881 
 (0.104) (0.134) (0.0627) (0.0844) 
Sum of Gamble choices 0.0958 0.190 0.0832 0.0471 
 (0.0813) (0.140) (0.0521) (0.0641) 
Period -0.0505 0.00490 0.104*** 0.0939*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0340) (0.0266) (0.0208) 
Constant -3.062*** -4.678*** -1.778*** -2.169*** 
 (0.833) (1.251) (0.517) (0.673) 
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 999 1,110 999 1,110 
Wald chi2 18.85 11.28 98.43 58.10 
Prob > chi2 0.1277 0.5873 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2   0.0385 0.0581 0.0985 0.0692 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
































Appendix G - Likelihood of Reaching the Threshold in Period 30 
 Dependent Variable: : Reached Threshold in Period 
30 (0/1) 
 
Independent Variables Gains Frame Loss Frame 
Loss and Risk 
Frame 
    
Announcement -1.180** 0.888** 0.658 
 (0.462) (0.443) (0.491) 
Loss Aversion (LA) Index  -0.167 -0.152 0.187 
 (0.148) (0.125) (0.182) 
Sum of Individual‘s Gamble Choices 0.207* -0.129 0.0408 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) 
Constant -1.350 -0.555 -2.898** 
 (0.935) (0.991) (1.405) 

















Prob > chi2 0.221 0.346 0.329 
Pseudo R2 0.0974 0.0912 0.0978 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 






































































Average Group Contribution Per Period in Successful Groups
Appendix H – Average Group Contribution per period for Groups Successful in Reaching 
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Loss Frame: Evolution of Free-riders by Announcement
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Gains Frame: Evolution of Fair-sharers by Announcement
A) Free-riders 
B) Fair-sharers 
